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 Executive Summary 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s estimate of the cost of meeting the new 
health-based ozone standard is likely to underestimate substantially the actual cost.  
EPA's cost estimates unrealistically assume that pollution control costs are capped at 
$10,000 per ton. Yet the required emission reductions in some cities exceed total motor 
vehicle emissions. 
 
By dropping EPA's assumption of constant cost, I show that meeting the standard 
in 2010 would cost nearly $5 trillion in one city, and $70 billion in seven other cities. 
These cost estimates exceed EPA's estimates of $10 billion per year by orders of 
magnitude.  I also find that the incremental costs of control are likely to far exceed any 
estimates of incremental benefits.  
 
 The high cost of meeting the ozone standard strongly suggests that it is likely to 
be infeasible to achieve in several cities. To avoid having EPA set such infeasible 
standards, Congress should amend the Clean Air Act to require the agency to balance the 
benefits and costs of regulation.  
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Environmentalists often contend that statutes should allow or require regulatory 
agencies to issue rules to protect the environment without regard to the cost of such 
protection.
1 They have argued this point so successfully that regulatory agencies and 
courts have interpreted statutory provisions that are silent on the role of cost to prohibit 
consideration of cost in regulatory decisions. These statutes include the act establishing 
Superfund,
2 the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
Perhaps the most notable such statute is the Clean Air Act, which directs the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set air quality standards to “protect public 
health” with an “adequate margin of safety”.
3 EPA and the courts have interpreted this 
language to prevent any consideration of cost.
4  
The neglect of cost in regulatory decision-making has given some key policy 
debates an Alice-in-Wonderland quality. In the case of the 1997 air quality standards, 
EPA Administrator Carol Browner rejected any consideration of cost until their 
implementation,
5 although there appears to be little flexibility at implementation because 
the Clean Air Act establishes specific deadlines by which compliance is mandatory.
6 This 
rejection was particularly important for the ozone standard, which EPA estimated had 
annual costs billions of dollars greater than likely benefits.
7 The statutory prohibition on 
considering costs thus provides a legal rationale for a policy position that otherwise 
would be bizarre. 
There is widespread misunderstanding of the cost of EPA’s 1997 air quality 
standards despite the attention to the standards.
8 EPA’s estimate of $48 billion per year is 
                                                            
1 See, for example, Browner (1997), “Costs of meeting the standards and related factors have never been 
considered in setting the national ambient air quality standards themselves...I continue to believe that this is 
entirely appropriate.” 
2 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. 
3 See Clean Air Act, Public Law 101-549,1970; 42 United States Code 7409.  
4 See EPA (1997a) for a discussion of earlier court cases. See also American Trucking v. EPA, 175 F.3d 
1027 (DC Cir 1999). See Lutter and DeMuth (1999) for a discussion of American Trucking.  
5 See Browner (1997). 
6 See, however, Melnick (1990). 
7 See EPA (1997b). 
8 See, for example, Wald (1999), Sunstein (1999), and Bentley and Haffner (1998). In May 1999, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit blocked the standards based in part on a finding that  
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based on an assumption that emissions reductions amounting to 80 percent of the total 
cost can be achieved at a constant rate of $10,000 per ton.
9 But this assumption lacks any 
empirical basis. More importantly, it violates the principle of diminishing returns. 
Therefore EPA’s cost estimates are likely to be too low by an amount that Shogren 
dubbed the “lost triangle”.
10 
Misunderstanding of the cost of the standards results from both the neglect of cost 
in regulatory decision-making and EPA’s campaign to persuade the public that the rules 
are reasonable. Since the standards are health-based, cost estimates are irrelevant during 
judicial review, and actual and potential litigants have not examined them. Public 
commenters did not examine EPA’s cost estimates because EPA published estimates of 
the cost of attaining the standards only after the deadline for public comments had 
passed.
11 Finally, analysts and advocates alike have seen little need to reassess the 
estimates because EPA’s estimates already imply that the standards are the most costly 
regulatory initiative of the decade.  
Such misunderstanding should be expected; independent analysts are often 
skeptical of agency estimates of the costs and benefits of their regulations.
12 Agency 
estimates are generally not subject to scientific peer-review or to judicial review. No 
government body independent of the executive branch reviews agency estimates of 
regulatory costs and benefits.
13 Moreover, agencies’ prospective cost estimates rarely 
coincide with retrospective estimates of the effects of regulatory actions.
14  
Yet the reliability of agency estimates of regulatory costs (and benefits) is 
important, because reliable estimates are necessary to satisfy the public’s right to know 
the expected effects of regulatory actions. Agency estimates of regulatory costs and 
benefits are typically the only official government estimates and thus are the basis of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
they represented an unconstitutional delegation of power. In October it rejected a request for an en banc 
hearing. EPA Administrator Carol Browner has said that she will seek an appeal and the Supreme Court 
may hear the case. See Lutter and DeMuth (1999). 
9 See EPA (1997b, ES-12 and ES-13). These and other values are in 1990 dollars. Values expressed in 1998 
dollars would be about 24 percent higher. 
10 See Shogren (1998). Of course, EPA disagrees. It writes “the $10,000 cost estimate for these reductions 
is intended to provide ample margin to account for unknown factors associated with future projects, and 
may tend to overestimate the final costs of attainment” (emphasis added), EPA (1997b, p. ES-9). 
11 See EPA (1996a) and (1997b). 
12 See Lave (1996). 
13 See Lutter (1999). 
14 See Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson (1999), and Lutter (1999).  
3 
recent efforts to satisfy the public’s right to know. The Unfunded Mandates Act of 1996 
requires regulatory agencies to estimate and report the costs of their regulatory decisions. 
In addition, Congress has directed the Office of Management and Budget to report on the 
costs and benefits of federal regulations, and its reports use agency estimates.
15 If 
unreliable cost estimates misinform the public about the merit of regulatory programs, 
these reform efforts will be ineffective.
16  
In this paper I reassess the expected costs of EPA’s 1997 ozone standard by 
relaxing EPA’s assumption that sufficient emissions reductions will be available at a cost 
of $10,000 per ton and reinterpreting the cost curves implicit in EPA’s analysis.
17 I find 
that attainment of the standard is infeasible in one city, and that costs in other cities in 
2010 are about seven times greater than EPA’s national estimates, even after allowing for 
technological progress. I also show that the cost of meeting the standard is not likely to 
fall over time—increasing levels of economic activity will dominate cost declines driven 
by technological progress. Thus, in cities where attainment is feasible but expensive, it 
may not be sustainable. Finally, I assess a set of emission control measures that is broader 
than those considered by EPA and includes taxes and fees on motor vehicle use and 
traffic congestion. I show that such implementation strategies would lower the cost of 
meeting the ozone standard, but that the cost would still exceed EPA’s estimates.  
The next section of this paper presents an analysis of EPA’s data. This analysis 
includes illustrations of cost curves for Los Angeles, cost estimates for eight metropolitan 
areas, and estimates of the rate of change of cost over time. The subsequent section 
discusses market-based implementation measures. The final section explores broader 
policy implications.  
 
                                                            
15 See Office of Management and Budget (1998). See also Hahn (1999) and Hopkins (1991). 
16 See Urdan (1999), for a discussion of recent legislative efforts to assign to the General Accounting Office 
responsibility for conducting benefit cost analysis of federal regulations. See also Lutter (1999) for a 
discussion of the merit of such ideas.  
17 I go beyond Shogren (1998) who did not provide an estimate of the size of the lost triangle, but limit my 
analysis to ozone. For particulate matter, an assessment of the importance of EPA’s assumption that 
necessary emissions reductions would cost no more than $10,000 / ton is complicated because EPA’s 
analytic approach is different than for ozone and involves other assumptions as well.  
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Analysis 
The single biggest difficulty in estimating cost is the need to extrapolate beyond 
the range of available data–a problem identical to one encountered in assessing the risk 
from environmental hazards. In assessing environmental risks, such as those from ozone 
and particulate matter, toxicologists and epidemiologists typically estimate an association 
between the risk of disease or injury and exposure to a hazard, at some level of exposure. 
They then extrapolate this association to estimate risk at much lower doses or levels of 
exposure. Of course, the extrapolation makes such estimates controversial.
18 In 
estimating the cost of meeting the ozone standard, I relate estimates of cost and emissions 
reductions for engineering-based control measures identified by EPA. These measures 
can achieve only a fraction of the emissions reductions needed to attain the standard in 
cities with serious air quality problems. Estimates of the cost of the standard must 
therefore involve extrapolations of cost curves well beyond the range of available data. 
Thus estimates of the cost of the ozone standard are subject to the same concerns about 
the validity of extrapolation as apply to low-dose risk assessments.
19 
In estimating the cost of meeting EPA’s air quality standard, I take for granted all 
aspects of EPA’s analysis with two exceptions. First, I relax its assumption that the cost 
of reducing emissions is capped at $10,000 per ton. Second, I allow explicitly for 
technological change and address uncertainties in future technological change by 
allowing for different rates of decline in marginal abatement cost.  
EPA’s estimates may be too low because they exclude indirect costs—a 
deficiency not addressed by this analysis. Indirect costs occur because efforts to remedy 
environmental problems can exacerbate distortions caused by pre-existing taxes. 
Economic research by Goulder and others indicates that indirect costs can be a large 
percentage of direct costs and may exceed them.
20 If estimates of indirect costs were 
added to the direct costs, the estimated total cost of meeting EPA’s standard would be 
significantly higher than the estimates presented here.  
                                                            
18 See, for example, Ames and Gold (1996) and Hendee (1996). 
19 Of course there are other sources of uncertainty. The baseline from which emissions are reduced is 
uncertain because of uncertainties in future levels of economic activity and in the effectiveness of pending 
regulations to limit emissions. The emissions corresponding to attainment of the air quality standards are 
uncertain because the relation between emissions and air quality is relatively poorly understood. 
20 See Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), and Goulder and Williams (1999).  
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An Illustration: Los Angeles 
I illustrate the analysis using EPA data from Los Angeles, Riverside and Orange 
counties, the area with perhaps the most severe ozone pollution in the country. Ozone is 
the product of chemical reactions involving sunlight and two sets of “precursors”, volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Since there are different control 
technologies for each precursor, I present cost information for each separately.
21 (See 
figures 1 and 2.)  
EPA’s data include cost and emissions reductions for a set of engineering 
measures to reduce emissions.
22 If these measures are ranked by their annual cost per ton 
of emissions reductions, they resemble a cost curve. In figure 1, I present EPA’s data on 
the cost of controlling VOCs and a marginal cost curve fitted to these points. The 
baseline for the emissions reductions in figure 1 is a scenario for 2010 in which economic 
growth lifts emissions beyond current levels, but more stringent control measures limit 
emissions. Emissions reductions are measured in tons per day during the ozone season.  
I estimate the marginal cost curve by assuming that the relationship between (the 
log of) marginal cost and (the log of) emissions reductions is quadratic. The fixed effect 
regression underlying this curve, presented in table 1, allows the slopes and the intercepts 
of the marginal cost functions to vary across the different metropolitan areas. As shown 
in table 1, almost all the coefficients in the cost functions are highly statistically 
significant and have the expected sign.
23  
The total cost of meeting the new standard is the area under the marginal cost 
curve between two levels of emissions. The first level corresponds to compliance with the 
old 1 hour standard that was issued in 1979, and the second level reflects attainment of 
the 8 hour standard issued in 1997. It is not clear from EPA’s analysis that these levels of 
                                                            
21 One control measure, a transportation control measure listed as “highway vehicles, gasoline”, reduces 1.1 
tons per day of VOCs and 2 tons per day of NOx at a cost of 6.8 million dollars per year. As there is no 
simple way to incorporate measures with joint products into this analysis, I delete this measure from the 
scatterplots when estimating the cost functions, but calculate the emission reductions needed to meet the 
standard after netting out the emissions reductions achieved by this control measure. 
22 The data are in an Excel file Case1i.xls available in the EPA docket.  
23 The data used in the regressions are for a subset of the cities analyzed by EPA. The subset includes all 
cities for which the cost of meeting the standard is likely to be high. In particular, I select cities if the 
necessary emissions reductions beyond the identified measures are at least 100 tons per day for VOCs and 
NOx combined and the reductions for each pollutant are greater than zero.   
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emissions correspond to the least-cost way of meeting the standard.
24 In particular, 
reducing NOx emissions a little bit more and VOCs emissions a bit less may reduce the 
total cost of meeting the air quality standard. In the absence of information about such 
tradeoffs, I use EPA’s estimates of the necessary emissions reductions.  
Rather than using a similar approach, EPA instead estimated cost by assuming 
that emissions reductions are available at $10,000 per annual ton per year, or about $4 
million per ozone season daily ton. Figure 1 presents a graphical depiction of EPA’s cost 
estimates as a rectangle.
25 The total cost of reducing VOC emissions to meet the 8 hour 
ozone standard in Los Angeles in 2010, from a baseline of attainment of the 1 hour 
standard, is about $340 million per year, according to EPA.  
For NOx, two estimates of the marginal cost of reducing emissions appear in 
figure 2. Curve a is the marginal cost derived from a total cost regression that is cubic in 
the log of emissions reductions.
26 Curve b, derived as for VOCs, is from the regression 
that appears in table 1. Interestingly, curve b appears not to fit the most expensive data 
points. Curve a, which appears to fit the Los Angeles data better than cost curve b, 
implies cost in 2010 of about $0.1 septillion for Los Angeles. Similar curves, however, 
do not fit data for other cities as well as the marginal cost functions that I choose to 
emphasize. EPA estimated the cost of reducing NOx in Los Angeles to be only $580 
million per year, an amount that is much less than the area under either cost curve a or b. 
The cost curves presented in figures 1 and 2 do not take into account the 
technological change expected to occur before 2010—something that is obviously 
difficult to forecast. Technological change among the identified technologies may be 
thought of as similar to the technological progress in manufactured goods. Research and 
development, learning-by-doing and human capital improvements will lower the cost of 
                                                            
24 See EPA (1997b). 
25 Since EPA did not estimate the costs of attaining the standards for each metropolitan area, I derive EPA’s 
cost estimates from the reductions in tons of emissions per day during the ozone season necessary to attain 
the 8 hour standard, adjusted to annual tons based on relationships between the daily emissions reductions 
and the annual emissions reductions of the control measures EPA identified, and EPA’s assumed cost of 
$10,000 per annual ton reduced. Excel File Case1i.xls, provided by EPA, indicates that the ozone season 
days per year implicit in the emissions estimates is 410 for NOx and 329 for VOCs. 
26 The regression equation for NOx emissions controls for Los Angeles is  
) 225 . 0 ( ) 82 . 2 ( ) 7 . 11 ( ) 2 . 16 (
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implementing these identified technologies, but the magnitude of such cost declines is 
hard to anticipate. Estimating the cost of implementing unidentified emissions reductions 
is even harder. When will research regarding these new technologies be completed? 
When will they be developed, marketed and adopted by industry, or mandated by 
regulators? What will be their cost and effectiveness when first adopted? There are no 
easy answers to these questions.  
For simplicity, I account here for future technological change by estimating the 
rate of decline in the cost of emission controls based on the set of new technologies listed 
by EPA in its regulatory analysis. The arithmetic mean of the average rates of annual cost 
decline observed among the technologies cited by EPA is 7.7 percent.
27 An annual rate of 
change of 7.7 percent implies that cost in 2010, thirteen years after EPA’s analysis was 
completed, would be about 37 percent of its 1997 value. This estimate overstates likely 
technological progress, however, because it reflects cost declines only in successful new 
technologies. Some new technologies, such as nuclear power generation, are adopted but 
then turn out to be more costly than originally anticipated. To account for such failures 
among new technologies I use 5 percent as an average rate of cost decline. In this case 
cost would equal 52 percent of their original values by 2010. The cost of meeting EPA’s 
ozone standard in Los Angeles in 2010, based on rates of decline in abatement cost of 7.7 
percent and 5 percent is $8.1 billion and $11.5 billion respectively.  
 How great would technological progress need to be in order for EPA’s estimates 
of cost to be correct? The cost of abating emissions would have to fall by 27 percent per 
year from 1997 to 2010 for EPA’s cost estimates to be correct. This is an extraordinarily 
and implausibly high rate of technological progress.  
 
Estimates for Other Cities  
For other cities the cost estimates are about $4700 billion in 2010, assuming that 
technological progress between 1997 and 2010 will lower cost by approximately half (see 
table 2.) All but $71 billion of the annual cost occurs in Fresno, California, where EPA 
estimates that NOx and VOCs must be cut by more than 60 percent from baseline levels. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
where er denotes emissions reductions, both total cost and emissions reductions are transformed into 
natural logarithms, and the standard errors appear in parentheses. 
27 This estimate reflects only retrospective estimates of cost declines.   
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But even ignoring the cost in Fresno, the cost estimates for the seven other cities—after 
netting out improvements due to technological progress—are seven times greater than 
EPA’s cost estimate. For the New York City nonattainment area, the total cost of 
attaining the 8 hour standard, after technological progress, is $2.9 billion per year. For 
Washington-Baltimore, however, the expected cost is $7.4 billion per year, and for the 
San Francisco area the cost is $24 billion per year.  
The true range of uncertainty about these cost estimates is quite large. The 
estimates are fairly sensitive to alternative assumptions about the form of the relationship 
between cost and emissions reductions, because they necessarily involve large 
extrapolations beyond the range of available data. Regressions not reported here tend, 
however, to give similar qualitative conclusions: costs are astronomical in a couple cities 
and generally many times greater than EPA’s estimates.
28  
 The broad conclusion—that the standard in some cities is too expensive to be 
met—is not surprising given that emissions reductions needed to meet it are very large 
relative to those available using identified measures. Table 3 shows estimates of the 
necessary emissions reductions, beyond the reductions from controls identified by EPA, 
as a percent of baseline emissions. Six cities require very large emissions reductions 
beyond those achieved by the identified measures: the reductions amount to more than 40 
percent of baseline emissions. In addition, all eight cities require emissions reductions at 
least four times greater than the reductions from measures identified by EPA. For two 
cities, necessary reductions are more than ten times greater than those identified by EPA. 
 
Changes Over Time 
EPA suggests that technological progress may lower compliance cost over time.
29 
But economic growth increases the emissions reductions necessary to meet the standard. 
Identifying the net change in cost over time is thus an unresolved empirical question.  
                                                            
28 Total cost functions that are quadratic in (the log of) emissions reductions implied that annual costs for 
two cities exceeded $1 trillion per year, for another city the cost exceeded $350 billion. The total cost for 
the remaining five cities I assessed was $19 billion per year. These estimates assume no technical progress. 
The regressions, however, have more coefficients that are statistically insignificant than the marginal cost 
functions presented here.  
29 See EPA (1997a).  
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The rate of change of total cost, as shown in the appendix, is a weighted average 
of the rate of change of the cost of controlling VOCs and the rate of change of the cost of 
controlling NOx, where the weights are the share of total cost associated with each 
pollutant. The rate of change of the total cost, TC, of controlling each pollutant, gTC, can 
in turn be estimated as  













L TC / ) (
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r  
where D is the annual rate of decline in cost as a result of technological progress, gL is the 
growth rate of laissez-faire emissions, and gR and gB are the elasticities of total cost with 
respect to emissions reductions evaluated at emissions reductions sufficient to meet the 
new standard, R, and to meet the old standard, B, respectively. The variables TC(R) and 
TC(B) are the total costs of achieving emissions reductions R and B from a baseline of 
zero reductions, and TC is the total cost of meeting the standard from a baseline of 
attainment of the old standard. 
 What do we know about the values of the parameters that determine the rate of 
growth of total cost? As described above, a good estimate of the rate of decline in cost is 
5 percent per year. The rate of growth in uncontrolled emissions, gL, is hard to estimate 
empirically in a regulated world but it is related to the rate of growth in real economic 
activity. Over the period from 1980 to 1997, GDP has grown at about 2.7 percent 
annually.
30 About a third of emissions comes, however, from the use of motor vehicles, 
which grows at the rate of about 2 percent per year.
31 Thus a good estimate of gL is a 
weighted average of motor vehicle and other emissions, where the weights reflect the 
shares of total emissions. This weighted average is about 2.5 percent.  
The variables gB and gR can be derived from the cost curves presented in table 
1.
32 For Los Angeles, the elasticities for NOx are 4.4, while for VOCs, gB and gR are 3.3 
and 3.2 respectively. 
                                                            
30 See Council of Economic Advisers (1999, Table B.2). 
31 See EPA (1997b).  
32 The use of this baseline, which may differ from the conceptually correct baseline, imparts no clear bias to 
the results. Equation (1) uses a laissez-faire baseline, while the cost curves presented in figures 1a and 1b 
use a baseline of full-compliance with technology based requirements of the Clean Air Act. The uncertainty 
associated with identifying laissez-faire emissions in a regulated world makes the conceptually correct 
baseline unworkable.   
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Using these estimates, and the values of B, R, and L implicit in figures 1 and 2, 
implies that the cost of controlling NOx (to the level of the new ozone standard) grows 15 
percent per year, while the cost of meeting the VOC standard (to the level of the new 
ozone standard) grows at 3 percent per year.
 33 The cost of meeting the ozone standard in 
Los Angeles therefore will grow at a weighted average of these two estimates, or 12 
percent per year, after 2010.  
The rate of technological progress will have to be 20 percent per year in order for 
the cost of meeting the standard in Los Angeles to fall after 2010, based on the preceding 
estimates and equation (1). Such technological progress appears extremely unlikely. 
Rapid growth in the cost of meeting the ozone standard does not imply that the 
present value cost of attaining the standard in perpetuity is infinite. That would be the 
case if annual cost continued to rise by more than the discount rate. But rising control 
cost would eventually curtail economic growth.
34 Indeed, rising costs suggest that cities 
that are able to attain the standard in 2010 may later find that attainment is too costly to 
be feasible.  
  
Improved Implementation Strategies  
 The preceding cost estimates, like EPA’s own estimates, ignore control measures 
based on behavioral changes—such as gasoline taxes and carpool programs—which 
some analysts believe can substantially reduce the cost of meeting EPA’s air quality 
standard.
35 In fact, while such strategies may be much more efficient than some of the 
control measures analyzed above, they do not alter the basic conclusions of this paper.  
  A study sponsored by the state of California reports that emissions control 
measures based on relatively small behavioral changes can be a cost-effective means of 
reducing local air pollutants (see table 4). Congestion pricing, for example, lowers 
congestion and greenhouse gas emissions in addition to reducing local air pollution, 
without an obvious effect on automobile accidents.
36 Since traffic delays are very costly, 
                                                            
33 For NOx, B and L and R are 318, 1048 and 460 respectively. For VOCs, the values are 526, 1064, and 
628 respectively. 
34 See Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
35 See EPA (1999).  
36 With less congestion average vehicle speeds rise, but it is unclear whether this would increase or 
decrease the social cost of vehicle accidents.   
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a reduction in them would offer large benefits that would likely offset other costs of such 
policies.
37 
 But the low-cost emissions reductions resulting from such innovative 
implementation strategies are small compared with the reductions needed to attain the 
ozone standard. The California report indicates that congestion fees above the levels in 
table 4 might not be economically justified.
38 A $0.50 per gallon gasoline tax would 
achieve only a 4 percent reduction in NOx emissions from motor vehicles; but even with 
a tax of $2.00 per gallon the reduction in motor vehicle emissions is only 12 percent.
39  
 In fact, the complete elimination of emissions from motor vehicles appears 
insufficient to attain the standard in 2010 in some places. In Los Angeles, for example, 
the necessary emissions cuts beyond the measures identified by EPA are 33 percent for 
VOCs, but only 20 percent of VOCs come from motor vehicles.
40 In San Francisco, the 





EPA’s estimate of the cost of its ozone standard is much too low. In one city the 
cost is more than a trillion dollars per year while in seven others the costs total $70 
billion per year, or about seven times EPA’s estimate. Attainment of the standard appears 
infeasible by 2010.  
Attainment costs are likely to rise in years beyond 2010. Costs will rise because 
progress in new control technologies will be outweighed by increases in baseline 
emissions resulting from economic growth. Thus attainment of the ozone standard may 
later become infeasible in cities where meeting it in 2010 is simply very expensive. 
The basic conclusion that the standard is infeasible is insensitive to changes in 
analytic methods. Of course, cost estimates based on extrapolations far beyond the range 
                                                            
37 See Edlin (1999) and Calfee and Winston (1998). 
38 See the California Air Resources Board (1996, Table 7.6). 
39 Ibid, Table 7.8. 
40 See California Air Resources Board (1999). Emissions projections for 2010 from CARB are not identical 
to EPA’s 2010 emissions forecasts. Thus CARB’s estimates of the percent of total emissions that come 
from motor vehicles may be different than EPA’s estimates; however, EPA’s estimates of emissions from 
different sources are not publicly available.  
41 Ibid.  
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of available data are very uncertain. But in two cities attainment of the standard will 
require emissions reductions more than ten times greater than can be achieved by the 
emission control measures identified by EPA. In addition, the complete elimination of 
motor vehicle emissions would not ensure attainment of the standard in some cities.  
Realistically, costs will never reach the trillions or even hundreds of billions of 
dollars per year implied by this analysis. Instead the managers of EPA’s clean air 
programs and representatives of States will find new flexibility to avoid attainment of the 
ozone standard. For example, under the Clean Air Act, the State of California has 
responsibility for developing State implementation plans that EPA approves and for 
enforcing emissions limits on polluters that contribute to violations of air quality 
standards. If the annual cost for a metropolitan area indeed reached the tens of billions or 
more, affected States would simply get extensions and waivers from EPA, Congress and 
the courts.  
Nevertheless, efforts to attain the ozone standard can still lead to costs that are 
excessive relative to the health and environmental benefits. EPA gave an upper bound 
estimate of the national benefits of the ozone rule of $8.5 billion per year,
42 but estimates 
of benefits consistent with the health effects estimated in the risk assessment blessed by 
EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Council are hundreds of millions of dollars at 
best.
43 These benefits estimates imply that a very generous upper bound for the benefits 
of controlling ozone is $10,000 per ton, and a more plausible value is a very small 
fraction of this estimate.
44 The upward slope to the marginal cost curves in figures 1 and 
2 indicates that the last increment of emissions controls to reduce ozone is likely to have 
costs hundreds or thousands of times greater than any estimate of projected benefits.  
With respect to regulatory issues more broadly, the ability of EPA to present 
erroneous estimates of the cost of a rule as important as its ozone standard should shed 
light on the merit of some regulatory reform initiatives that are popular in Washington. 
Initiatives that seek to increase the importance of agencies’ estimates of the cost of their 
                                                            
42 See EPA (1997b, ES-16). 
43 See EPA (1996a). 
44 See Lutter and Wolz (1997) and Lutter and DeMuth (1999) for an argument that reductions in ozone 
increase human exposure to harmful ultraviolet radiation by so much that the expected health 
improvements may be nil.  
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own regulations, without first ensuring the reliability of such estimates, can contribute to 
the public’s misperceptions.  
Finally, this analysis indicates a new need for cost to be considered in setting air 
quality standards. After all, adopting standards more stringent than is feasible does not 
improve children’s health or the environment. Such standards do not provide health 
benefits any greater than less stringent ones, and the existence of infeasible mandatory 
standards may contribute to distrust of governmental institutions. In addition, there is 
little sense in setting standards that would cost many times more than the value of the 
benefits. To ensure a frank discussion of the tradeoffs implicit in major policy decisions, 
Congress should amend the Clean Air Act to direct EPA to consider costs in setting air 
quality standards. In particular, it should direct Congress to balance costs and benefits in 
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Note:  The scatterplot excludes controls which reduce both NOx and VOCs and controls which have zero cost according to the EPA.  The area 
described as Los Angeles includes Riverside, Orange and Los Angeles Counties.  Emissions reductions are from EPA's baseline of 1054 tons per 
day.  A cost per daily ton of $4 million is equivalent to a cost per annual ton of about $10,000.  The benefits of controlling ozone are much less 
than $4 million per daily ton.
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Figure 2
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Note:  The scatterplot excludes controls which reduce both NOx and VOCs and controls which have zero cost according to the EPA.  The area 
described as Los Angeles includes Riverside, Orange and Los Angeles counties.  Emissions reductions are from EPA's baseline of 1048 tons per day.  
A cost per daily ton of $4 million is equivalent to a cost per annual ton of about $10,000.  The benefits of controlling ozone are much less than $4 
million per daily ton.
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reductions to meet 
8 hour standard
Emissions 
reductions to meet 
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EPA's estimated costs = 
$580 million
Control measures 
identified by the EPA
Marginal Cost b Marginal Cost a 
19 
Table 1 
Marginal Cost Regressions for Eight Metropolitan Areas 
 
Variables  Volatile Organic 
Compounds  
Nitrogen Oxides  








Bakersfield, CA  








Fresno/Visalia-Tulare, CA  








Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange  








New York City-New Jersey-
Long Island 











































2   0.9984  0.9979 
Number of Observations  121  101 
 
Note: The table presents coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Control measures that reduce 
both VOC and NOx, and measures with zero cost are excluded from the regressions. All variables are in 





Costs of Meeting the Ozone Standard in Selected Metropolitan Areas in 2010 




5 Percent  7.7 Percent 
Area  Cost of Meeting 
VOC Target 
Cost of Meeting 
NOx Target 
 
Total Cost of 
Meeting the 8 
Hour Ozone 
Standard 
Total Cost of 
Meeting the 8 
Hour Ozone 
Standard 
Bakersfield, CA  5.3  15  20  14 
Fresno-Visalia-Tulare, CA  1.6  4700  4700  3300 
Los Angeles-Riverside-
Orange 
2.4  9.1  12  8.1 
New York-New Jersey-
Long Island 
0.97  1.9  2.9  2.0 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-
Atlantic City 
0.68  0.69  1.4  0.96 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA  0.71  2.8  3.5  2.5 
San Francisco-Modesto- 
Stockton-Lodi 
1.3  23  24  17 
Washington-Baltimore  2.2  5.2  7.4  52 
Total Excluding Fresno   14  57  69  50 
Total  15  4700  4700  3300 
 
Note: These cities are all those in EPA’s data set with combined VOC and NOx deficits greater than 100 
tons per day and non-zero deficits for each pollutant.  
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Table 3 
Meeting EPA’s Ozone Standard Requires Very Large Emissions Cuts 
 
Reductions in 2010 to Meet the 8 
Hour Standard Beyond the 
Identified Measures / Baseline 
Emissions (percent) 
Reductions in 2010 to Meet 
the 8 Hour Standard / 




VOCs  NOx  VOCs  NOx 
Bakersfield, CA  59  32  13  2.3 
Fresno-Visalia-Tulare, CA  61  62  6.6  8.8 
Los Angeles-Riverside-
Orange 
43  33  3.7  3.9 
New York-New Jersey-
Long Island 
32  39  2.6  9.4 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-
Atlantic City 
26  31  2.6  4.8 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA  37  51  4.3  31 
San Francisco-Modesto- 
Stockton-Lodi 
28  45  3.1  7.1 







Alternative Emissions Control Measures in 2010 
May Achieve Limited Emissions Reductions Cost-Effectively  
 






Tax rate  Metropolis 
Traffic 







19 ¢ per 
mile  
LA area  32  9.6  8.1  3.6  $7300  Congestion 
pricing 




27  8.3  6.9  3.2 
 
Not in U.S. 
$2300 






/day  SF Bay 
area 
2.9  1.1  1.0  .9 
 
Not in U.S. 
$500 
LA area  9.5  9.3  4.1  3.8  $3700  Gasoline tax  $0.50 / 
gallon  SF Bay 
area 
8.5  8.8  3.5  3.3 
 
Yes  $1300 
LA area  11  5.2  4.2  3.9  $3100  Mileage fee   




9.0  4.1  3.8  3.6 
 
Not in U.S.  $1100 
 
Source: California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, 1996. Note SF Bay area refers 







Total costs can be written as  








where B(t) is the baseline emissions reductions, that is those that would occur in the 
absence of the air quality standards; t is an index for time, R(t) represents the emissions 
reductions necessary to meet the standard; e
-Dt is a factor accounting for cost declines 
related to technological progress assumed to occur at annual rate D; MC is the marginal 
cost of emissions reductions; and r indexes the amount of reductions. Applying Leibnitz’s 
rule implies  
(2)   ' ) ( ' ) ( / B B MC e R R MC e TC t TC
t t r r r
- - - + - = ¶ ¶  
Using gx to denote the growth rate of a variable x, (2) implies  





TC / ' ) ( / ' ) (
1 r r r




Given that R and B rise at constant rates, (3) simplifies to  






g g B B R R TC
) ( ) (
e e r - + - =  
where gR and gB are the elasticities of total cost with respect to emissions reductions 
evaluated at emissions reductions R and B respectively, and TC(R ) and TC(B) are the 
total costs of achieving emissions reductions R and B from a baseline of zero reductions. 
Note that emissions reductions B and R both grow over time because of growth in 
emissions under a laissez-faire policy. In fact, if laissez-faire emissions are L(t), then B' = 
R' = L'. 
Since gR(R/L)=gB(B/L)=gL, it follows that  
(5)  )










r - + - =  
Equation (5) is applicable to a cost curve for a single pollutant. Since both NOx 
and VOCs contribute to ozone, I develop here an analogous expression applicable when 
there are two cost curves. Note that the total cost of meeting the ozone standard can be 
expressed as the sum of the costs of reducing VOCs and NOx :   
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(6)   NOx VOCs C C TC + =  




























CVOC TC + = . 
Thus, the growth rate for total cost is a weighted average of the growth rates for the cost 
of attaining the VOC target and the cost of attaining the NOx target, where the weights 
are the shares of total cost attributable to VOCs and NOx respectively. 
 
 